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 1. Introduction 
The purpose of this note is to introduce how to evaluate strategic choices of the firm using 
economic principles. The procedure is based on simple cost benefit considerations such as building 
on the economic principles of incentive compatibility constraints based in Game Theory. 
2. Strategies and Nash equilibrium 
In Game theory consumers or firms (agents) are the object of interest, as they make choices relevant 
in economics. Their choices are made by them considering the profit or utility they get with regard 
to the choice. If a set of or a choice provides more profits than other choices then it is said to be 
dominant strategy of the agent.  
Strongly and weakly dominant strategies 
A strategy i ix X of player i is called a strongly dominant strategy if for every other strategy 
' `i ix x and every strategy profile i ix X  of the other players, it is the case that
'( , ) ( , )i i i i i iu x x u x x  , which is it provide a higher pay-off than all other strategies given other 
players’ strategies. 
 
A strategy is called a weakly dominant strategy if it is the case that '( , ) ( , )i i i i i iu x x u x x  , which is 
it provide a higher or just as good a pay-off than other strategies given other players’ strategies. 
 
In game theory the most prominent solution concept is Nash Equilibrium (NE). A NE consists of 
the best reply an agent can make given the best reply of other players. The best reply of a player in a 
NE is a strongly or weakly dominant strategy, which means that for an agent would never choose a 
strategy that provide a lower payoff if a different strategy leads to a higher payoff, but always 
choose a strategy that provide a payoff at least as high as any other strategy that the firm has, 
assuming that the other agents adopt their own equilibrium strategies in the same way. 
Definition of Nash equilibrium or the optimal strategic choice 
The profile of strategies * *(..., ,...)x x is a Nash equilibrium if for every player i I , the strategy *ix
is a best reply to the strategy profile * *(..., ,...)i j j ìx x  of the other players. 
 
This sets the stage for how to evaluate strategic choices of firms and consumers. 
3. The strategic choices of a monopolist 
The last section showed us that the optimal strategic choice of a firm is the set of dominant 
strategies or the dominant strategy that provide the highest possible payoff given the best strategy or 
best reply of other firms. Thus, to evaluate two optimal strategies under different assumptions about 
firm behaviour or the market in which it operate in we have to compare the payoff of the firm in 
each case. The case with the highest possible pay-off is then the best strategy of the two. 
To understand how this works in practice the following two cases of strategic choice of a 
monopolist. The strategic choices we will evaluate are the incentives the monopolist receives by the 
mutual exclusive strategies of setting one price versus setting many prices. 
If the monopolist sets one price it uses the uniform pricing condition of setting its marginal revenue 
equal to its marginal costs, whereas many prices imply that the monopolist uses its knowledge 
about consumers to set prices equal to each consumer’s reservation price which is the price equal to 
the consumer’s maximum willingness to pay. 
Under uniform pricing the monopolist’s objective is to maximize the area M in the below figure 
(Figure 1). 
Figure 1. Uniform pricing and resulting profit of a monopolist
 
The optimal price choice is the monopoly price Mp , as it provides the highest possible pay-off to the 
monopolist. Thus, it is the price that dominant all other uniform price choices and given that the 
monopolist is the only player on the market, it is also the NE of the game. The profit of the 
monopolist is the incentives the firm receives when choosing the uniform pricing strategy and we 
need to calculate this to assess whether the uniform monopoly price is dominant to a strategy where 
the monopolist is charging many prices. 
The monopolist profit when setting a uniform price is, 
 ( )M M Mone p MC Q    (1.1) 
A strategy of charging many prices of a monopolist for the same product require that the monopolist 
is able to identify the maximum amount each consumer or consumer group is willing to pay for the 
product. If the monopolist is able to do so, it is able to price discriminate among its customers. 
Assuming that it is able to identify all its customers’ willingness to pay, the first degree price 
discrimination is the optimal solution for it. This implies setting all the prices in the interval
*,p p A    as this provides the highest possible pay-off to the monopolist in Figure 2. This set of 
prices is a dominant strategy to any other possible subset of prices consisting of more than one price 
and given that the monopolist is the only player on the market, it is also the NE of the game. The 
profits to the monopolist is the area Mmany which is, 
  12
M M
many manyA MC Q    (1.2) 
Figure 2. Setting many prices and resulting profit of a monopolist. 
 
  
4. Evaluating the strategic choices of the monopolist 
Comparing the profit of the monopolist in the two cases it is easy to see that, 
 M Mone many   (1.3) 
Thus, whenever possible the monopolist will prefer to set many prices to setting a uniform price. 
An analysis of strategy can have many levels. So far the analysis have been from the point of view 
of the firm, but we could also take other considerations into account for example evaluate the 
strategies from a society perspective by considering the strategies in the light of the impact on social 
welfare or consider what effect competition authority scrutiny would have on the strategic choices 
of the monopolist. We will do this in turn below. 
Society perspective (neoclassical approach) 
Assessing the impact of the pricing choices of the monopolist, we have to make assumptions about 
the calculation of social welfare like what do we include in the measure. To make things simple we 
will consider social welfare and the effects of the two pricing strategies as the sum of consumer 
surplus (CS) and producer surplus (PS) compared to the optimal social welfare level, which is that 
under perfect competition. 
In the case of perfect competition the social welfare is using the drawing in Figure 2, 
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Evaluating if the strategies of the monopolist is preferable from the point of view of society imply 
evaluating the following, 
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Thus what we have to do to evaluate if a uniform pricing strategy is preferable from a society 
perspective is to evaluate, 
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Due to the dead-weight characterising uniform pricing of monopolies, then from a society 
perspective uniform pricing is not preferable. 
In the case of many prices the evaluation entails the same. Thus, 
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Thus, from a society perspective many prices are preferable. 
Competition authority perspective 
Competition authorities (CAs) also consider the impact of concentrations has on social welfare, but 
they distinguish themselves from other analytical approaches by only considering the impact on 
consumer surplus.  
The impact of the pricing strategies of the monopolist is from the perspective of CAs,   
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Thus, a uniform price is preferable to many prices as many prices do not leave any CS to 
consumers, whereas uniform pricing does. 
5. Bringing it all together 
The existing practice of CAs towards price discrimination shows, that CAs realize that price 
discrimination does improve social welfare as long as the pricing is not loyalty inducing or provide 
too excessive incentives to customers to repeat their purchases from the price discriminating firm. 
Since this is a matter of taste more than anything else, it is reasonable to assume that in some cases 
CAs will find price discriminatory behaviour of firms for anti-competitive and apply fines and 
penalties to firms that engage in such practice. 
If this is the case the CAs introduces disincentives towards firms using many prices. Thus, the 
appropriate incentive constraint to consider for a monopolist is, 
  1M Mone many   

   

 (1.9) 
Where  is the probability of being found anti-competitive  0 1   and is the fine or penalty 
the firm will get in that case. The left hand side is the profits from a uniform price strategy and the 
right hand side the expected profits from using price discrimination or many price strategy. 
The overall impact on social welfare now depend on to what degree the CAs actively pursue firms 
charging many prices as well as the size of the fine applied. The choices can be seen as CAs’ policy 
variables and as how an activity from an authority can intervene into the functioning of a market. 
6. Conclusion 
Strategic choices of firms and consumers in a more complex setting are naturally a lot more than the 
above have shown. Nevertheless the idea of this paper is not to involve the reader in a complex 
decision making framework but to exemplify how the strategic interaction of firms, competition 
policy and standard welfare economic considerations work together. 
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